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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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Abstract
Countless studies have shown that local officials are
less responsive to ethnic minority citizens. Surprisingly,
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we find no similar pattern of discrimination by Taiwan-
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ese local officials. In an online contacting experiment,
we send citizen service requests to the websites of
358 township and district chiefs, randomly varying the
name of the putative citizen to reflect an indigenous or
an ethnically Chinese identity and collecting data on
officials' responses. We find that officials are equally
responsive to both identities. Drawing on in-depth
interviews and nonparticipant observation in government service centers, we attribute this surprising finding to institutional elements of Taiwan's local
bureaucracy that limit the impact of individual-level
bias. However, our research provides preliminary evidence that local governments are generally less responsive in indigenous areas. While clearly defined
procedures may prevent discrimination against indigenous individuals, interregional differences in local state
capacity can nonetheless produce unequal experiences
with local governance.

1 | INTRODUCTION
Does the presence of an elite bureaucracy, operating according to rules that limit bureaucratic
discretion, diminish ethnic bias in responsiveness? Since 2011, a series of experiments has
The pre-analysis plan for this project is registered with EGAP. Project is approved by the Harvard University Area IRB
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demonstrated that officials are less likely to respond to online requests for help from citizens
who are ethnic or religious minorities. In both democracies and autocracies, these studies suggest that in-group bias leads officials to be more responsive to members of their own ethnic
group. Since most officials are not ethnic minorities, in-group bias leads to lower response rates
or lower-quality responses to requests from minority citizens.
These findings have been replicated in diverse contexts ranging from the United States to
South Africa and mainland China (Butler & Broockman, 2011; Distelhorst & Hou, 2014;
McClendon, 2016). And there are many reasons to believe that we should observe the same pattern in Taiwan, where there is ample evidence of discriminatory attitudes and behavior toward
indigenous people. In 2018, newly appointed Executive Yuan spokesperson Kolas Yotaka was
ridiculed by netizens and DPP critics for using a Romanized spelling of her indigenous name
instead of a Chinese name.1 Recently, indigenous activists in Taiwan have also protested violations of indigenous land rights, tourists' lack of respect for indigenous culture, and the absence
of meaningful language rights.2 Indeed, the vibrancy of Taiwan's indigenous rights movement
in recent years is a response to indigenous groups' long history of poverty and discrimination
(Huang & Liu, 2016).
It is perhaps surprising, then, that we find no evidence that local officials in Taiwan are less
responsive to indigenous citizens than to ethnically Chinese ones. Indeed, across a range of
parametric and nonparametric specifications, and across four different measures of
responsiveness—whether officials respond to a citizen's request for help, and the length, timeliness, and quality of that response—we observe no statistically significant differences between
the responses to putatively Han and indigenous citizens. Drawing on in-depth interviews with
officials and citizens, nonparticipant observation in district service centers,3 and government
documents, we argue that the distinctive character of Taiwan's bureaucracy limits opportunities
for discriminatory behavior. The bureaucracy—an elite, highly regularized descendent of the
earlier “developmental state” (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 2004)—effectively constrains local public
servants and creates few opportunities for the kind of individual discretion that can lead to discrimination, at least in the context of online responses to constituent service requests. However,
the absence of individual discrimination does not imply the absence of structural barriers to
access that disproportionately affect indigenous people. While some of Taiwan's local governments are adept at using websites, smartphone apps, and other relatively new tools to connect
with and respond to citizens, others are largely unable to use these tools effectively. Because
these problems occur disproportionately in areas with relatively large indigenous populations,
these groups may be poorly served by new e-governance mechanisms even in the absence of
overt discrimination.
This article thus seeks to make three main contributions. First, we expand the methodological toolbox that has been used to study local government responsiveness. Online contacting
experiments are useful for causal inference, but leave important questions about external validity unanswered. Furthermore, the lack of qualitative evidence in these studies can make it difficult to identify the causal mechanisms that produce their results. We therefore complement an
experiment with interviews and nonparticipant observation in the social services office of several local government service centers (qugongsuo) to better understand how local officials serve
citizens in face-to-face encounters, and why we fail to observe the patterns of bias that seem so
pervasive elsewhere in the world. Second, this methodological contribution leads to an important substantive insight: Taiwan's particular blend of local-level institutions for streamlining the
work of local officials, and monitoring their performance, helps to limit opportunities for bias.
Finally, our results point to the importance of contextualizing experimental results within
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broader observational data. Even when a given official is equally responsive to Han and indigenous citizens, ethnic inequality may still emerge if local governments are less responsive to all
citizens in the places where indigenous people disproportionately live.

2 | EXISTING LITERATURE
Contacting experiments are widely used to understand local officials' responsiveness to citizens.
By randomly varying either the identity of the putative citizen reaching out to officials or the
content of the citizen's appeal, researchers seek to understand to whom—and to what kinds of
messages—officials are most responsive. In democracies and autocracies alike, existing research
has shown that local officials tend to be more responsive to members of the ethnic majority
population, a result largely attributed to in-group bias that leads politicians from both ethnic
majority and ethnic minority groups to favor their fellow group members (Alesina, Glaeser, &
Sacerdote, 2001; Butler & Broockman, 2011; Distelhorst & Hou, 2014; McClendon, 2016; White,
Nathan, & Faller, 2015). Perhaps surprisingly, these results seem quite consistent across authoritarian and democratic contexts, although responsiveness may be driven by different motivations in the two.4 Overall, Costa (2017)'s meta-analysis suggests that minority constituents are
almost ten percentage points less likely to receive responses than their nonminority counterparts. One limitation of the existing experimental literature is that it does not assess whether
(or why) the same dynamics guide officials' decision making regarding online and in-person
responsiveness. This article thus makes an important contribution by embedding an online
contacting experiment within a broader multi-method approach, conducting ethnographic
nonparticipant observation in local government service centers and interviews with local officials in these centers to gain a broader understanding of the dynamics of local government
responsiveness.
While the use of audit studies to assess local government responsiveness is a relatively
recent development in political science, these studies join a much longer tradition of research
into “street-level bureaucracy” (Lipsky, 1980)—the front-line state employees who represent
the most frequent point of contact between citizens and government. Lipsky's seminal work on
the topic noted that American teachers, police officers, social workers, and other “street-level
bureaucrats” do not merely implement social policy, they make it. Much recent scholarship has
agreed with Lipsky that street-level bureaucrats exercise substantial discretion over their work
(Evans, 2010; Evans & Harris, 2004; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), although some follow
what Zacka (2017) calls the “compliance model,” assuming street-level bureaucrats to be at
their best when they hew as closely as possible to written policies. And some argue that discretion has been substantially limited by the increasing importance of managers and by the role of
computers in replacing human “street-level bureaucracy” with largely automated “system-level
bureaucracy” (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002; Lymbery, 1998).
While most scholars agree that street-level bureaucrats continue to exercise some degree of
discretion, there is substantial debate over the normative implications of this fact
(Nothdurfter & Hermans, 2018). Some argue that discretion creates opportunities for intrusive,
unpredictable, and highly variable services, and for exploitation of citizens who use street-level
services (Goodin, 1988). But others see discretion as unavoidable and potentially positive provided that bureaucrats are well equipped for the kind of complex moral decision making that
such discretion demands (Zacka, 2017). By bridging the gap between the literatures on streetlevel bureaucracy and on ethnic bias in government responsiveness, we aim to introduce an
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important element to this discussion, drawing attention to the ways in which procedural limitations on bureaucratic discretion may limit opportunities for ethnic bias among “street-level
bureaucrats.”

3 | T A I W A N ' S E V O L V I N G P O LI T I C A L I N S T I T U T I O N S
The extent of ethnic bias, and the role of political institutions in ameliorating or exacerbating
these biases, is a live issue in Taiwan today. Taiwan's indigenous population, which makes up
about 2% of the country's population, was historically subjected to brutal treatment by Chinese
settlers. Indigenous Taiwanese remain socially disadvantaged relative to the Han Chinese
majority; they have a lower education level, a lower life expectancy, and a higher obesity rate
(Ho & Tsai, 2007; S.-L. Tsai, 2004; Wen, Tsai, Shih, & Chung, 2004). They face discrimination in
the labor market, are often pushed into low-wage jobs, and have trouble accessing social welfare benefits (Chiao, 2008; Chu, 2000; Wang & Wang, 2019). Furthermore, indigenous Taiwanese often suffer from higher rates of mental illness due to the pressure to integrate into Han
society (Y.-Y. Tsai, 2007b). In recent years, demands for greater minority inclusion have led to
the creation of several new political institutions to represent indigenous interests, most importantly the Council of Indigenous Peoples (a ministry-level entity that is part of the Executive
Yuan) and a system of reserved seats for indigenous peoples in the national legislature. However, these institutions have had limited effects on the substantive representation of indigenous
peoples' interests, and continued discrimination and racist attitudes toward indigenous peoples
mean that these new guarantees on paper may not translate into equal representation in practice (Ku, 2005; Templeman, 2018).
These concerns over the representation of indigenous minorities are one part of a broader
national conversation over local governance and representation in Taiwan. A relatively young
democracy, Taiwan was ruled by a one-party dictatorship under the Nationalist Party (KMT)
for decades. In the 1980s, the KMT began a gradual process of democratization, spurred by both
social pressure and ruling party calculations (Slater & Wong, 2013; Yang, 2007). Since holding
its first direct presidential election in 1996, Taiwan has gradually reformed its political institutions (Stockton, 2010). These changes have helped to create an increasingly competitive electoral system, albeit one that continues to be marred by charges of personalism and corruption.
Alongside Taiwan's developing democratic institutions sits an elite bureaucracy in the tradition
of Japan's postwar “developmental state” (Johnson, 1982). Taiwan's bureaucracy is highly educated, elite, and technocratic, and has long played an important role in guiding public policy
(Greene, 2008; Wade, 2004; Wong, 2005). In recent years, the bureaucracy has begun to transition into a more service-oriented workforce, with a greater focus on effectively meeting citizens'
needs for basic public services.
One increasingly important component of citizen service—for both elected and appointed
officials—has been an emphasis on “e-governance” tools. Since the late 1990s, Taiwan's government has demonstrated a strong commitment to using technology to promote better governance, and citizens increasingly take advantage of e-government opportunities like the ability
to easily file their taxes online. In 2013 alone, almost 375,000 unique complaints and requests
were made to local governments via email, and another 100,000 to the central government
(National Development Council [Taiwan], 2010). However, the development of these services
has been largely driven by top-down mandates that local governments create particular forms
of online services, rather than by bottom-up demands for services from citizens (Hung, 2012).5
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Our study—as far as we know, the first of its kind in Taiwan—thus has the potential to provide
important information about how well officials are actually using the services they have created
to respond to citizens' needs.
This article focuses on a set of officials, some elected and others appointed, that play an
essential role in basic service provision across Taiwan. Taiwan's 22 cities and counties are
divided into 368 districts (164 urban qu, 174 rural xiang, zhen, and xianxiashi, and 30 indigenous shandixiang and yuanzhuminqu). In urban districts, the top official (quzhang) is bureaucratically appointed; in rural and indigenous districts, they are directly elected by citizens.
For simplicity, we translate the top leader's title as “district chief” across all types of districts.
The district chief, and the district-level bureaucracy over which they preside, is responsible
for implementation of many of Taiwan's social welfare programs, including the national
health insurance program; social welfare programs for the elderly and disabled; local infrastructure and sanitation (garbage disposal, road and streetlight maintenance, pest removal);
childcare subsidies; and many others. While these programs are generally funded by, and carried out in consultation with, the government of the city or county in which a given district is
located, district-level officials are an important resource for citizens seeking to access Taiwan's social welfare system. While they are certainly not the only “street-level bureaucrats” to
whom citizens turn for help—city council members, neighborhood leaders (lizhang), and
block captains (linzhang) are all at the front lines of citizen service as well (Read, 2012)—the
district chief and their staff represent an important point of contact between citizens and the
local state.

4 | DATA AND METHODS
We submit requests for help, putatively from Taiwanese citizens, to the online “Mayor's Mailbox” or email address of 358 district chiefs, randomly varying the name of the citizen to be
indigenous or Han Chinese. We first stratify by district type (elected vs. appointed, with elected
districts further stratified into indigenous and nonindigenous districts), randomly assigning
treatment within each stratum. We exclude the localities of Kinmen (six townships) and Matsu
(four townships), which are geographically and culturally quite distinct from the rest of Taiwan.
We then assess whether local politicians are more responsive to requests by ethnically Chinese
constituents than others. We measure responsiveness in terms of (a) whether a response is
received, (b) response quality (an assessment of how completely they address the putative citizen's needs), (c) response time, and (d) length of response.6
In the second round, we swap treatment and control groups—in other words, the politicians
that received an email from a putatively indigenous citizen in the first round receive an email
from a putatively Han citizen in the second. This enables us not only to compare responsiveness
between treatment and control groups in each round, but also to assess the within-person treatment effect (i.e., whether on average each official was less responsive to the indigenous than
the Han citizen).
Hello,
My friend told me that the government provides a childcare subsidy. I just had a baby. Can
you please tell me how I can meet the application requirements? Thank you!
Randomly assigned Han Chinese or indigenous name
In round one, the English translation of the email that each official received was as follows:
In round two, the email was as follows:
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Hello,
I am expecting a baby in December. After I give birth I plan to temporarily stop working. I
heard there is a subsidy available. Can you please tell me how to apply?
Randomly assigned Han Chinese or indigenous name
These treatments are useful tools for assessing local government responsiveness for several
reasons. First, based on the publicly posted responses to citizen questions on some local government message boards, these are realistic questions that a citizen might pose to the district chief.
Second, because the requests are straightforward and relate to a regular part of these officials'
duties, responding requires minimal time on the part of officials, an important ethical consideration for IRB approval.

5 | R E SUL T S
5.1 | Overall responsiveness is high
After excluding Kinmen and Matsu, any districts that did not provide contact information, and
any districts whose email addresses bounced or whose “Mayor's Mailbox” submission forms
failed to load, we were able to successfully submit requests for assistance to 328 of Taiwan's
368 district-level administrative divisions (89.1%) in the first round, and 290 in the second
round.7 We report balance statistics in Table 1 and baseline summary statistics on our four measures of responsiveness in Table 2. On the whole, our results suggest that Taiwan's citizens benefit from unusually high rates of responsiveness, at least where online requests are concerned.
We received 268 responses to the 328 requests for help we were able to successfully send in
Round 1, a baseline response rate of 81.7%. In cross-national comparison, this rate is extremely
high. Costa (2017)'s meta-analysis of 41 experimental studies on responsiveness suggests that
the average responsiveness rate in such studies is 53%, and that the highest observed responsiveness rates were the 78–79% response rates in a study conducted in Germany (Grohs,
Adam, & Knill, 2015). In Round 2, the response rate declined to 74.8% (217/290)—still quite
high by international standards. As early as 2002, other sources described Taiwan as a leader in
implementing e-governance programs; our results suggest that Taiwan has remained a global
leader in this area (West, 2002).
T A B L E 1 Balance statistics
Variable

Indigenous name

Han name

T pval

KS pval

Area (km)

9,605

9,361.4

0.90

0.39

Population

63,232

68,311

0.56

0.63

Indigenous %

8.65

11.23

0.34

0.15

Total income

12,540,478

16,385,741

0.13

0.63

Per capita income

717.09

745.51

0.08

0.12

Tsai Ing-wen vote share

0.36

0.34

0.07

0.06

Sex of district chief

0.14

0.17

0.44

NA

Note: We report balance on valid data (i.e., all cases to which we were able to submit an email or a “Mayor's
Mailbox” request in round 1). “KS pval” refers to bootstrapped Kolmogorov–Smirnov p-values (from a nonparametric test for the similarity of two continuous distributions).
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T A B L E 2 Response quality measures (descriptive statistics)
Outcome

Definition

Round

N

Range

Mean

SD

Response

1 if response was received, 0 otherwise

1

328

0–1

0.82

0.39

Response

1 if response was received, 0 otherwise

2

290

0–1

0.75

0.43

Length

Number of words

1

268

22–6,260

457.9

474.4

Length

Number of words

2

217

26.0–5,823.0

424.3

556

Span

Hours to response

1

263

8.52–968

111.32

131.53

Span

Hours to response

2

214

0.47–2,650.53

124.6

251.67

Quality

Five-point scale (NA if no response)

1

268

0–5

3.6

1.2

Quality

Five-point scale (NA if no response)

2

217

0–5

3.2

1.4

This is consistent with qualitative evidence from interviews with local officials in district
service offices, who reported online responsiveness as a small but increasingly important component of their jobs. They use online platforms—Facebook, “Mayor's Mailbox” websites, LINE
(the most popular messaging app in Taiwan), the local government website, city-specific
smartphone apps, and so on—to give information to citizens and communicate specific details
(for instance, about the content of an application form) more clearly and effectively than they
could over the phone.8 As one district chief described: “I am on this [gestures to his
smartphone] all the time. I check it in the middle of the night; if a message has come in for me,
I try to quickly respond. This really is a 24-hour job now.”9
Top-down policies and citizens' expectations regarding online service both create pressures
for fast and effective online responsiveness. In cities with appointed district chiefs, the chiefs
are evaluated annually on their implementation of policies designated as especially important
by their superiors at the city level. In recent years, e-governance has figured prominently among
these high-priority policies.10 While officials report a generational divide among citizens, with
young people much more likely to use e-government services, these services allow for more efficient and effective communication between officials and the citizens who do adopt them.11 And
districts that effectively use e-governance techniques to achieve other policy goals have been
rewarded with recognition as top-performing districts. For example, Banqiao District was
recently recognized as one of the top-performing district governments in New Taipei City; one
of the key policy targets set for district governments was to increase the participation of elderly
people in health and exercise programs, and Banqiao was rewarded in part for creating an app
to enable citizens to monitor their health and running a series of activities to teach elderly people to use the app.12
Citizens have come to expect a high degree of responsiveness via e-governance mechanisms,
and use these very mechanisms to complain when they are dissatisfied with local government
performance. For instance, one citizen used the Xinwu district Facebook page to complain
about the district government's lack of responsiveness: “The Xinwu district service center does
not respond to citizens' complaints, and thus fails to fulfill the duties of public servants.”
Another citizen responded, “Right! According to the evaluation by the city government's
research and development office, the Xinwu district service does not provide a form on which
citizens can record their degree of satisfaction.”13 This exchange reveals that citizens care about
online responsiveness—they are sufficiently dissatisfied when the tools they are promised on
paper are not delivered in practice to find other avenues (such as Facebook pages) to publicly
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complain. Hung (2012) has argued that the development of Taiwan's e-governance has been
driven largely by top-down policies, but our research suggests that citizens have come to expect
that these mechanisms will be available to them, are able to evaluate whether local governments are following the law regarding provision of e-governance tools, and are vocal in their
complaints when they find existing e-governance tools lacking.

5.2 | No evidence of anti-indigenous bias
These high overall response rates could, in theory, mask substantially unequal patterns of
responsiveness to different groups of citizens. However, our results suggest that this is not the
case. Table 3 provides regression results for our four measures of responsiveness, controlling for
a range of pretreatment covariates. While putative subjects with indigenous names receive
slightly fewer responses than those with Han names (84.1 vs. 79.3% in round 1), in none of our
models is the treatment effect statistically different from zero. Furthermore, even if these results
were statistically significant, their substantive significance would be comparatively small. The
upper bound of the 95% confidence interval around our results is 13.3% in round 1 and 16.2% in
round 2 (in other words, we can say with 95% confidence that the true gap in response rate to
emails from Han and indigenous citizens is less than or equal to 13.3% in round 1 and 16.2% in
round 2). While these upper bounds would be cause for concern if our results suggested that
they were the true differences in responsiveness to the two groups of citizens, these numbers
are still low by comparative standards (for instance, they are less than half as large as the mean
difference in responsiveness to Han and minority names reported by Distelhorst &
Hou, 2014, 33%).
We conduct several robustness checks to increase our confidence in these results. First, we
check bivariate models (dropping all covariates). Second, we reshape several covariates, logging
income, population, and area. In both cases, there is still no statistically significant treatment
effect. Third, we recode our response quality measure to include nonresponses. We conduct a
Box-Cox transformation on these data (appropriate given the nonnormal shape of the data),
and find no statistically significant treatment effect.14 Fourth, we use randomization inference
to assess the bivariate association between treatment and each outcome in a nonparametric
framework, and find no statistically significant difference between treatment and control groups
for any of the four outcomes. Fifth, we check for heterogeneous treatment effects by elected/
appointed status; we do not find evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects across the two
types of districts. Finally, including Huber-White robust standard errors changes the statistical
significance of some covariates but does not affect our central finding.15
The results in Table 3 are cross-sectional; in other words, they compare average outcomes
across the group that received an email from a putative indigenous citizen to averages for the
group that received an email from a putative Han citizen. One advantage of our multi-wave
design is that it allows us to expose each district to both the treatment and the control conditions, as individuals who received an email from a putative Han citizen in round 1 received an
email from a putative indigenous citizen in round 2, and vice versa. In expectation, randomization should produce treatment and control groups that resemble each other across a range of
covariates, but this can never be proven. Using a two-way fixed-effects model allows us to assess
whether a single individual is, on average, more or less responsive to emails from putatively
Han or indigenous citizens, rendering concerns about the comparability of treatment and control groups irrelevant.

−0.37

(0.29)

−0.40

(0.30)

312.51

Akaike Inf. Crit.

Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

−149.25

328

322.93

−154.47

290

(0.36)

(0.33)

(0.35)

(0.36)

−0.40

−0.07

1.52***

(0.01)

(0.01)

1.80***

(0.0000)

−0.0000

−0.004

−0.0000

(0.01)

−0.01

(0.01)

−0.01

(0.0000)

(0.01)

−0.01

(0.01)

0.005

(2)

(1)

0.01

Logistic

Logistic

Log likelihood

Adjusted R2

R

2

Observations

Constant

Elected

Area

Income

% Indig.

Population

Treatment

Response (2)

Response (1)

Dependent variable

0.02

0.04

268

(0.17)

3.85***

(0.17)

−0.49***

(0.01)

−0.005

(0.0000)

−0.0000

(0.005)

0.01

(0.003)

0.0004

(0.15)

−0.10

(3)

OLS

Quality (1)

T A B L E 3 Cross-sectional regression results by dependent variable and round

0.06

0.09

217

(0.21)

3.63***

(0.21)

−0.82***

(0.01)

0.004

(0.0000)

0.0000

(0.01)

0.003

0.03
0.004

0.02

217

(86.73)

581.89***

(85.52)

−181.52**

(3.25)

2.10

(0.01)

0.005

(2.30)

−0.14

(1.53)

−1.57

(77.71)

−98.56

(6)

OLS

Length (2)

−0.01

268

(67.15)

553.44***

(66.18)

−91.49

(2.65)

−0.64

(0.004)

0.003

(1.79)

−0.62

(1.11)

−0.98

−0.001
(0.004)

(59.41)

−40.22

(5)

OLS

Length (1)

(0.19)

−0.18

(4)

OLS

Quality (2)

0.02

0.04

263

(18.56)

98.07***

(18.31)

12.84

(0.73)

−0.84

(0.001)

0.0004

(0.49)

1.27**

(0.30)

−0.15

(16.42)

18.08

(7)

OLS

Span (1)

0.07

0.10

214

(37.97)

82.86**

(37.62)

17.91

(1.42)

2.27

(0.002)

0.001

(1.01)

2.27**

(0.67)

−0.25

(34.21)

2.38

(8)

OLS

Span (1)
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T A B L E 4 Panel regression results

Dependent variable
Response

Quality

Length

Span

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.05**

−0.07

−46.00

760.09

(0.02)

(0.13)

(46.42)

(1,106.09)

Observations

618

485

485

477

R2

0.02

0.002

0.005

0.002

Treatment

Note: *p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

Table 4 presents the panel results. By using a two-way fixed-effect model in each case, we
essentially compare each individual to themselves. Because our covariates do not vary between
the two rounds, these models look only at the bivariate relationship between treatment and
each outcome measure. As in the cross-sectional results, treatment has no statistically significant association with the length, quality, or time to response. While indigenous identities are
5% less likely to receive a response than Han identities, this is not statistically significant when
we correct for multiple testing.16 This responsiveness gap is also substantively small in crossnational comparison; Costa (2017)'s meta-analysis finds that across 31 papers on government
responsiveness, minority constituents are almost 10% less likely to receive a response than
nonminority constituents. A second piece of evidence that treatment assignment does not matter very much lies in the extremely low R2 for each model. At 0.02 or less for all four models,
treatment assignment appears to explain very little of the variation in each of the four outcome
measures.
While our results do not provide evidence of individual-level discrimination against indigenous citizens, they do provide preliminary evidence for interregional disparities that may negatively affect indigenous people and the services they receive from local government. Table 3
suggests that officials in districts with elected chiefs provide shorter, lower-quality responses
than those with appointed chiefs. Because, in accordance with the Local Government Act (difang zhidufa), all indigenous districts have directly elected chiefs, the possibility that directly
electing a chief might lead to lower responsiveness has significant implications for responsiveness in indigenous areas.17 In other words, these findings suggest that the poor services in indigenous areas may be a byproduct of a broader interregional inequality between places that elect
their district-level officials and those whose leaders are appointed via a city-level bureaucratic
process. Not just indigenous districts, but also rural ones outside major cities—which typically
elect their township heads—are disadvantaged by this system (Newland, 2019).
Nonetheless, poor responsiveness in indigenous districts cannot be fully explained by the
underperformance of directly elected district-level heads, as districts with a larger proportion of
indigenous citizens in the population take longer to respond (see Table 3). While the correlation
between response time and indigenous share in the population is positive for both indigenous
and nonindigenous districts across both rounds of the experiment, it is strongest within indigenous districts. While these results should be viewed as suggestive—high nonresponse rates in
indigenous districts mean that we have data on response time for only a small number of indigenous districts—we hope that future research will explore why a larger proportion of indigenous residents appears to be associated with slower response times by local officials.
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In addition, if we compare responsiveness between the 30 officially designated indigenous
districts and nonindigenous districts, we find large differences. In both rounds of the experiment, officials in indigenous districts were substantially less responsive than officials in
nonindigenous districts: The response rate for round 1 was 83.8% across nonindigenous districts
and only 57.7% across indigenous districts. In round 2, both groups were slightly less responsive
overall, but the responsiveness gap remained almost the same: 77.3% of nonindigenous districts
responded to our emails, whereas only 50% of officials in indigenous districts did. A Welch's
t-test for groups with unequal variances shows that these differences are statistically significant
at p < .02. These disparities suggest that the absence of individual-level discrimination is not a
sufficient condition to guarantee truly equal responsiveness by local officials. If the types of districts with disproportionately large indigenous populations—districts with elected chiefs and
officially designated indigenous districts—have local officials that underperform relative to officials elsewhere in Taiwan, then these regional disparities may produce interethnic inequality
even if individual officials are no more responsive to Han citizens than to indigenous ones.
We conduct preliminary tests of two possible explanations for the responsiveness gap
between indigenous and nonindigenous areas. First, we hypothesize that an e-governance “digital divide” might exist between these two types of areas, such that local officials in
nonindigenous areas are better equipped to set up high-quality websites for addressing citizen
needs and are better trained to use the online format to respond quickly to citizen requests for
help. To test this hypothesis, we create a “failed to send” indicator coded 1 for pages with broken “mayor's mailbox” links, email addresses that bounce, or “mayor's mailbox” pages that time
out after submitting a request. In round 1, 30 districts' pages failed to send; four of these were
from indigenous districts. In round 2, eight districts' pages failed to send; one was from an
indigenous district. These small numbers provide limited evidence, and we believe that this
hypothesis warrants further investigation with other data sources. However, based on the data
we have, we do not see convincing evidence of indigenous district governments' relative inability to effectively use e-governance tools. While indigenous districts' pages represented a slightly
higher share of total failed pages than we would expect based on their share of total districts, a
difference in means test for indigenous and nonindigenous districts is not statistically significant, and the divergence from their share in the population is substantively quite small.
A second possibility is that responsiveness is lower in indigenous areas because they are
poorer than other areas of Taiwan, and local governments have fewer resources for citizen service. That indigenous citizens are economically disadvantaged is well established (Chiao, 2008;
Chu, 2000). However, does this extend to local governments in indigenous areas? We test this
hypothesis using 2015 budget data for 194 districts with elected leaders across Taiwan.18 Using
data on budgeted (yusuan) and actual (juesuan) administrative expenditures (xingzheng zhichu),
we find no evidence of meaningful differences between indigenous districts and nonindigenous
ones with elected chiefs. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test fails to reject the null hypothesis that two
sets of data are drawn from the same underlying distribution (p = .46 for budgeted expenditures
and 0.34 for final expenditures). Furthermore, in per capita terms, indigenous districts have
higher administrative expenditures than their nonindigenous counterparts. In short, local budget data do not support the hypothesis that district governments in indigenous areas face
greater resource constraints than elected governments in nonindigenous areas do. A third class
of possible explanations involve the nature of service provision in indigenous areas. Do indigenous citizens use alternative mechanisms for connecting with local officials (for example,
through social organizations, in-person encounters, or political parties) that lead officials to
place little importance on online service provision? While the data we use in this article cannot
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answer this question, we hope that future research will investigate this and other possible explanations for the “digital divide” we observe between indigenous and nonindigenous areas.

5.3 | Qualitative results: making sense of a surprising null finding
Given the consistent evidence of racial bias by local officials around the world, it is somewhat
surprising that we find no such evidence in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this was a possibility that we
envisioned as we designed this article; we hypothesized that strongly rule-bound performance
of the Taiwanese bureaucracy might limit opportunities for individual bias to affect responsiveness to citizens.19 In this section, we use fieldwork conducted in Taiwan in 2016 and 2019 to
make sense of our experimental results. Drawing on interviews with citizens and public servants, as well as nonparticipant observation in district service centers in four cities and counties
throughout Taiwan, we argue that formal rules and informal norms constrain district officials
and prevent their individual biases from affecting their job performance. We discuss two types
of factors that inhibit bias in online responsiveness: strict formal procedures that include frequent top-down monitoring, and dedicated institutions for serving indigenous people.
The officials who staff district service centers are constrained by a series of specific norms
and procedures that limit discretion in their interactions with citizens. The physical layout of
the district service center embodies many of these constraints. In large urban districts, citizens
typically get a number from a ticket machine upon entering the social welfare section; as an
attendant becomes available, a screen above their desk flashes the next number, and the person with that number on their ticket walks up to the desk. In other words, there is no opportunity for an official to choose to serve an ethnically Chinese citizen rather than an
indigenous one, and in many cases an official may not even know the citizen's ethnic identity
until after their interaction is under way.20 The spatial arrangement of the service hall also
makes it difficult for poor-quality service to go undetected. The social welfare section is typically a large, open room, with service desks in close proximity to each other and to the waiting
area for citizens. Large district offices often have a volunteer area within the social welfare section, staffed primarily by retirees who offer tea and basic assistance. The section head
(shehuike kezhang) typically works in close proximity to the service desks.21 In short, the dense
configuration of citizens, volunteers, and officials within the space of the social welfare
section increases the likelihood that inattention, rudeness, and other manifestations of bias
will be noticed and corrected.22
Rules and procedures for online interactions between officials and citizens are similarly constrained. City and county governments in Taiwan set rules for how quickly districts must
respond to citizen communications. The rapidity with which our putative citizens received
responses from many officials suggests that these rules are, in most cases, taken quite seriously;
on average, it took about 5 days for our requests for help to receive a response. Furthermore,
these procedures are quite transparent and are made widely available to citizens. In many cases,
submitting a request for help to an online “mayor's mailbox” generates an automated reply that
tells the sender how quickly the local government is required to respond. Some local governments also publicize the procedures for online responsiveness on their websites, specifying who
is responsible for communication at each step and the timeframe for responsiveness. For
instance, Dashe District, Kaohsiung provides a diagram stating that any request must be
addressed in 5 business days if the matter can be resolved by the district office and 30 business
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days if it must be forwarded to the city. Some districts and cities provide even more detail, specifying the maximum length of time for each step in the process.
These procedures limit opportunities for ethnic bias in responsiveness in several ways. First,
they limit discretion more broadly. For instance, the variance of legally acceptable response
times is small when all messages must receive a response within 5 days; even if indigenous citizens received slower responses, the substantive difference between a response in 3 days and a
response in five is minimal. Of course, this presumes that the standards set by city governments
are binding. Other research suggests that it is: City governments exercise frequent and meaningful oversight of district officials through regular meetings, research and development offices,
annual performance evaluations, and other tools (Newland, 2019).
Second, breaking up steps in the response procedure across multiple officials decreases the
likelihood that one “bad apple” will systematically disadvantage indigenous citizens. In addition to the fact that each response passes across multiple desks, the people answering these
queries change from day to day, as (at large district service centers, at least) public servants all
take turns answering phone and email queries.23 While these mechanisms cannot guard against
the possibility that implicit bias might affect many officials' responsiveness to indigenous citizens, they at least make it unlikely that a handful of biased officials will be able to substantially
alter responsiveness procedures or outcomes.
In addition to the rules and procedures that limit the opportunities for bias (and the magnitude of the effects of bias if it is present), a set of district-level positions designed explicitly to
ensure that indigenous people have access to the local bureaucracy also helps to minimize the
potential for bias against indigenous citizens. Each district service center is required to staff an
indigenous affairs desk, which provides specialized services to all indigenous residents of the
district. This is a required position regardless of the size of the local indigenous population; in
districts with small indigenous populations, these desks are much less busy than the general
social affairs desks or other offices that serve a broader population of citizens. In one Taipei district service center, for instance, the civil servant who staffed the indigenous affairs desk
reported seeing 6–8 citizens per day, whereas officials in the social affairs office met with several citizens per hour.24 Indigenous people are free to seek help from the regular social affairs
office as well, but have the additional option of working with the dedicated representative for
indigenous affairs, who is often tasked with administering social welfare programs such as
housing rental subsidies, emergency assistance, and home repair subsidies that are available
specifically to indigenous people.25 These workers have specific interest and expertise in indigenous affairs—the positions are their own category in the civil service exam—and provide an
additional channel by which indigenous people can seek government assistance.

6 | C ON C L U S I ON
This article has argued that on the whole, Taiwan's district-level governance appears to be both
effective and equitable. At the time of our first experiment in 2017, almost 90% of Taiwan's
district-level governments provided a working method for citizens to contact the local district
chief online. Of these, over 80% responded to our citizen service requests. On the whole, these
responses arrived quickly and provided at least some of the information our putative citizens
needed. We also find no evidence that local officials are biased in their responsiveness: They
were equally responsive to emails from putatively Han and indigenous citizens across a variety
of specifications. We argue that these findings—while surprising in the context of Taiwan's
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history of discrimination against indigenous people and the overwhelming evidence of discrimination in audit studies in other national contexts—make sense if we delve deeply into the local
political-bureaucratic context. We argue that the strongly institutionalized procedures for public
servants, and the existence of special mechanisms for serving the needs of indigenous citizens,
prevent individual bias from translating into systematically different experiences of representation for Han and indigenous people.
One important caveat is in order: Bias may take multiple forms. The results of this study
suggest that a given public servant is no more likely to respond to a request for help from a Han
citizen than an otherwise identical indigenous one (or to offer a longer, better, or faster
response). However, we cannot experimentally vary the real-world context in which indigenous
people live, and Han and indigenous people are not, in many cases, “otherwise identical.” Our
data provide preliminary evidence that predominantly indigenous areas have lower levels of
online responsiveness than predominantly Han areas: Across the two rounds of our experiment,
officials in officially designated indigenous areas responded to only 53.9% of the emails we sent,
in comparison to the 80.7% response rate of officials in nonindigenous areas. While the small
number of indigenous districts limits the statistical tools that we can use to meaningfully analyze these differences, the fact that there was a responsiveness gap of close to 30% points in each
of the two rounds of the experiment should increase our confidence that the first-round results
were not a fluke.26
Consistent with Newland (2019), our results suggest that districts with appointed chiefs consistently outperform districts with elected ones. Since the Local Government Act (difang
zhidufa) specifies that all indigenous areas should directly elect their district or township chiefs,
this finding has particular salience to indigenous people. Ironically, while the direct election
requirement is intended to enshrine the principal of indigenous sovereignty in national law,
our results suggest that in practice this policy may make local officials in indigenous areas less
responsive to citizens. In short, even in the absence of individual-level discrimination, indigenous people may receive worse treatment if they disproportionately live in areas where local
governments are less responsive overall. While these claims warrant additional investigation,
our research provides preliminary evidence that this form of systemic racism is a concern in
Taiwan.
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